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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE
VALLEY, INC., a corporation,
Appellant,

v.
SECURITIES COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH; HAL S. BENNETT, DONALD HACKING, STEWART M. HANSON, Commissioners
of the Securities Commission of the
State of Utah; and M. H. LOVE, Director, Securities Commission of the
State of Utah,
Respondents,

Case No.
8468

v.
FUNERAL DIRECTORS AND EMBALMERS ASSOCIATION OF
UTAH, a corporation,
Intervener.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action for a declaratory judgment brought
under the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 33, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
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No issue of fact is involved. The parties, through their
counsel, stipulated to an agreed statement of facts (R. 1824) . The statement discloses essentially the following facts:
Appellant is a Utah corporation organized for profit. It
owns a parcel of land in Salt L~ke County, Utah, embracing
71.5 acres, which it has dedicated as a cemetery and is now
engaged in the development and operation of this property
for such purposes. In the development of this cemetery
and the sale of lots therein, the lot purchaser signs a proposed contract together with a written statement in the
form of the instruments shown at R. 21 and R. 23. Upon
approval of the statement and the form of contract as signed
by the purchaser, appellant signs and delivers the contract
to the purchaser. Upon payment of the stipulated purchase
price and funds for perpetual care, appellant delivers a
deed to the burial space in the form of the instrument shown
at R. 22.
The contract among other things requires appellant to
design and construct a garden or gardens, to expend certain
funds for development, to provide for care and maintenance and to issue a deed upon payment of the lot purchase
price and the funds for perpetual care.
Salesmen for appellant in selling burial spaces explain
to the purchaser the proposed plan of development of the
cemetery and that the burial spaces will increase in value
as the development is carried out. The statement signed
by the purchaser, however, contains provisions that the
property is being acquired for burial purposes only and not
for investment or speculative purposes and that appellant
does not agree or promise to resell the lot purchased.
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The deed identifies the burial space purchased and
contains a certificate by the appellant as grantor that
pursuant to the contract, appellant has placed certain funds
in trust, the income from which shall be used for the care,
maintenance and protection of the cemetery.
Other cemeteries in the State of Utah sell burial spaces
under contracts and deeds similar to those of the appellant.
Some, but not all cemeteries provide for perpetual care of
the cemetery grounds and burial spaces. Of the cemeteries
providing for perpetual care, some establish a fund either
voluntarily by their charter, or by agreement with the
purchasers of the burial spaces. None of such cemeteries
other than Aultorest Memorial Corporation has registered
its contracts, deeds or other instruments similar to the
contract and deed of appellant as a security with the Securities Commission of Utah. The contract of Aultorest Memorial Corporation registered as a security is in the form
of the instrument shown at R. 24. The Aultorest agreement
in addition to providing for the sale of a burial space embodies provisions for a burial contract or a burial certificate.
No such provision is contained in the contract or deed of
appellant.
The question presented here is whether the contract
and deed of appellant are a security within the provisions
of Section 61-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The trial
court, on the basis of the facts presented, held that these
instruments are a security. From such determination, this
appeal is taken.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
I.

THE CONTRACT AND DEED ARE NOT A
SECURITY AS DEFINED BY THE UTAH
STATUTE.
(a)

The instruments are not within the express
definition of the statute.

(b)

The instruments are not commonly known
as a security.
II.

THE ENACTMENT OF CHAPTER 11, LAWS
OF UTAH, 1955, REMOVES ANY PUBLIC
NEED OR POLICY FOR CONSTRUING THE
CONTRACT AND DEED AS A SECURITY.
ARGUMENT
There is no suggestion in this case that appellant is
engaged in promoting or carrying out any fraudulent
scheme or plan. Sale of lots are made by appellant for
burial purposes in the usual course of its business. No
representations are made that purchase of lots should be
undertaken as an attractive speculation or as a means of
reaping profits but on the other hand the buyer is required
to sign a statement that the purchase is made for burial
purposes only. It is readily admitted that purchasers are
informed that lots acquired in the early development of the
cemetery will be more valuable as such development is carried on and completed. This is a natural and necessary result from the development and beautification of a cemetery.
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The cost of providing a resting place for human remains
is one of the necessary and inescapable expenses of this
existence. It is desirable and proper that this expense
should be discharged at a moderate cost. If one may do
so, by purchasing a lot in a cemetery under development,
he should have an opportunity to do so. This is not a matter of embarking on a speculative venture or one entered
into for profit but simply a case of exercising common
sense in minimizing a necessary expenditure.
The question as we see it here is therefore essentially
one of whether a contract for the sale of a cemetery lot
under which the cemetery agrees to perform certain duties
with respect to the development of the cemetery, to care
for and maintain the same and to create a fund to insure
such care and maintenance coupled with a deed to the lot
pursuant to the contract, constitutes a security under Utah
law.
I.

THE CONTRACT AND DEED ARE NOT A
SECURITY AS DEFINED BY THE UTAH
STATUTE.
The controlling statute here is Section 61-1-4, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. It has two general features. It
includes by express definition certain instruments which
are a security and then has a general provision including
any other instrument commonly known as a security. In
the presentation of the problem we think it orderly, therefore, to consider the two features of the statute.
(a)

The instruments are not within the express
definition of the statute.
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Section 61-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which defines a security, provides as follows:
"(1) 'Security' shall include any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond, debenture or evidence of indebtedness; certificate of interest or participation
or certificate of interest in a profit-sharing agreement; certificate of, contract for, or any conveyance
or other instrument conveying, representing, or purporting to convey or represent, an interest or any
right in, to or under any oil, gas or mining lease or
permit; collateral trust certificate, preorganization
certificate, or preorganization subscription; any
transferable share, investment contract, service certificate, burial certificate or burial contract; investment-trust certificates, shares or units, or beneficial
interest in or title to property, profits or earnings;
certificate of membership in, contract or agreement
given, made or issued by, any corporation, association or organization wherein a discount, reduction
in price or other advantage, privilege or right in or
to the purchase of merchandise are held out or
agreed to be given or made ; and any other instrument commonly known as a security, including any
plan or scheme wherein townsites, town lots, or acreage, or any other land division in fee or in leasehold
shall be used in connection with the gift or sale of
any security as herein defined."
All of the instruments expressly identified above under the
facts involved in this case, with the exception of one category may, we believe, be dismissed as being inapplicable to
the case at bar. The classification "any transferable share,
investment contract, service certificate, burial certificate
or burial contract" requires some further consideration.
Under the facts of this case where the purchaser must
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expressly agree that he acquires the property for burial
purpose only and not for investment or speculative purposes
with the understanding that the appellant does not promise
or agree to resell the lot purchased, we think the contract
and deed must clearly not be considered to be an investment contract. These instruments are not a service certificate because the covenants of appellant relate only to obligations with respect to the development, preservation and
care of the cemetery property. They do not extend any
services to an individual. An examination of the contract
and deed will disclose that there are no provisions therein
for the funeral or burial of a decedent. In this respect the
contract under investigation is to be distinguished from
that of Aultorest Memorial Corporation (R. 24) which
contains such provisions. It is for this reason that registration as a security was required in the case of the Aultorest
contract, but not in the case of the contract and deed under
investigation.

It therefore appears to us that the instruments under
investigation do not fall within the specific definitions of
the statute and if within its terms must be within the designation of "any other instrument commonly known as a
security".
(b)

The instruments are not commonly known
as a security.

If the instruments involved here are not included in
the express definitions of the statute, then in order to be
within its terms they must be commonly known as a security.
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Deferring for a moment the consideration of cases
which have involved this problem, and approaching it from
the standpoint of the business man, there would seem to be
little doubt that the purchase of a cemetery lot for burial
purposes would not be regarded as an investment for profit
or commonly considered as a security.

It is common knowledge that cemeteries which have
no provision for care and maintenance may become most
depressing and unsightly areas. Provisions in contracts
covering the purchase of cemetery lots and in deeds for
the conveyance of the same which are designed to insure
care should be in the interest of the individuals involved
as well as the public generally and should not, in our judgment, have any real bearing on the question of whether the
instruments are commonly known as a security.
Courts in many cases have had occasion to define the
words "security" or "securities". For our purposes here
we deem it unnecessary to cite numerous authorities. The
subject was carefully considered in Equitable Trust Co. v.
Marshall, 17 A. 2d 13, (Delaware) where the Court at page
15 said:
"Strictly and technically, the word 'security',
when used in connection with matters of a pecuniary
nature, may, perhaps, mean 'that which renders a
matter sure; an instrument which renders certain
the performance of a contract'. 2 Bouv. Law Diet.,
Rawle's Third Rev., p. 3032. In discussing the meaning of that word, the statement is made in Black's
Law Dictionary that 'the term is usually applied to
an obligation, pledge, mortgage, deposit, lien, etc.,
given by a debtor to make sure the payment or performance of his debt by furnishing the creditor with
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the resource to be used in case of failure in the
principal obligation'. Strictly construed, originally
the kindred word 'securities' was, therefore, primarily 'a general term for written assurances for payment of money; evidences of debt.' Abbott's Law
Diet. In other words, the strict primary meaning of
that word was at one time confined to a secured obligation or promise to pay of some nature, and did
not include either corporate stocks or mere debentures. Scott on Trusts, 1228; Restatement Law of
Trusts, Vol. 1, p. 657; In re Waldstein, 160 Misc.
763, 291 N. Y. S. 697. But at the present day, by
common usage, the word 'securities', though standing alone and unaided by the context of the instrument in which it is used, has acquired a broader and
more general meaning, and is frequently used as
synonymous with words which originally may have
had quite a different meaning. Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Lowy, 123 N. J. Eq. 90, 196 A. 369; In re
Vanderbilt's Estate, 132 Misc. 150, 229 N.Y. S. 631;
City Bank Farmers Trust Co·. v. Lewis, 122 Conn.
384, 189 A. 178 ; 2 Schouler on Wills, 6th Ed., 1228 ;
56 C. J. 1279, 1282. In this connection, Mr. Schouler
aptly says: 'Present usage gives (to that word) a
generous scope far beyond its literal meaning'. 2
Schouler on Wills, 6th Ed., 1288, supra. Modern
dictionaries have recognized this change in the
meaning of the word 'securities,' and have defined
it as 'an evidence of debt or of property as a bond,
a stock certificate or other instrument, etc. ; a document giving the holder the right to demand and
receive property not in his possession'. \Vebster's
New Inter. Diet.; 7 Cent. Diet. 5460. Most courts
and text writers have, therefore, held that certificates for shares of corporate stock are 'securities,'
notwithstanding the fact that they merely represent
the particular interest of the owner in the corporate
capital and' in its surplus assets on dissolution. Fi-
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delity Union Trust Co. v. Lowy, 123 N. J. Eq. 90,
196 A. 369; In re Vanderbilt's Estate, 132 Misc.
150, 229 N. Y. S. 631; In re Waldstein, 160 Misc.
763, 291 N. Y. S. 697; City Bank Farmer's Trust
Co. v. Lewis, 122 Conn. 384, 189 A. 178; Scott on
Trusts 1228; Restatement Law of Trusts, Vol. 1, p.
697. This is conceded by the residuary devisees and
legatees. Moreover, in reaching that conclusion,
courts have necessarily and logically recognized the
fact that in the ordinary vocabulary of modern life,
the term 'securities' is usually applied to almost any
instrument which is used for the purpose of financing and promoting a business enterprise of some
nature, and which is intended as an investment of a
pecuniary nature. In re Waldstein, 160 Misc. 763,
291 N. Y. S. 697; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Lowy,
123 N. J. Eq. 90, 196 A. 369; In re McGraw's Estate,
337 P. 93, 10 A. 2d 377; In re Vanderbilt's Estate,
132 Misc. 150, 229 N. Y. S. 631; 56 C. J. 1279; see,
also, Romer, L. J., In re Rayner (1904) 1 Ch. 176.
But that term does not ordinarily apply to the evidence of title to land, as such, or to any share or
interest therein. Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sandf. Ch.
494; Pratt v. Worrell, 66 N. J. Eq. 194, 57 A. 450;
Narragansett Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Burnham, 51 R.I.
371, 154 A. 909; First Nat. Bank v. Rawson, 56 Ohio
App. 388, 11 N. E. 2d 110; Senior v. Braden, 295 U.
S. 422, 55 S. Ct. 800, 79 L. Ed. 1520, 100 A. L. R.
794."
In considering the definition of the word "securities"
in relation to the Blue Sky Law, the Court in Prohaska v.
Hemmer-Miller Development Co., 256 Ill. App. 331, held
that:
The term "securities" as used in the Blue Sky
Law means written assurances for the return or payment of money except where specific definitions are
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given by the statute, and it means the investment
of funds in a designated portion of the assets and
capital of a concern with a view of receiving a profit
through the efforts of others than the investors.
Turning to the precise question of instruments involving the sale and purchase of cemetery lots, the general rule
is stated in 79 C. J. S. Security; Securities, page 949 as
follows:
"* * * A conveyance of a cemetery lot, or a
certificate granting the right of burial in such a lot,
ordinarily is not regarded as a security since usually
it is not considered to be an investment, and is an
interest in real estate, but when such interests become the subjects of speculation in connection with
the cemetery enterprise the courts have held such
conveyances or certificates to be securities."
An annotation on the subject is found in 163 A. L. R.
1075, where the editor states substantially the same rule
thus:
"While undoubtedly documents purporting to
convey or vest an interest in a cemetery lot for the
use of the purchaser or his family would not be
classified as 'securities' under most 'blue sky laws,'
it has been held under the circumstances involved
in some cases that instruments relating to the sale
of such lots to a buyer expecting profits from their
subsequent resale constituted 'securities' subject to
regulation."
The cases cited in C. J. S. and included in the A. L. R.
annotation substantially support the rule as stated. The
case of State v. Lorentz, 22 N. W. 2d 313 (Minn.) is the
most recent on the subject which we have been able to find.
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In that case where cemetery lots were being sold on a
wholesale basis, for speculative purposes, the majority of
the court determined that the sale of such lots was a security under Minnesota law. The Court in doing so, however,
at page 316 of the report pointed out that:

"* * * where burial lots are sold in the
usual course for burial purposes, the statute of
course does not apply."
The phrase "any other instrument commonly known
as a security" appears to have been brought into the Utah
Code by the provisions of Section 2, Chapter 87, Laws of
Utah, 1925. We have been unable to find any decision of
this Court defining this phase. So far as we have been able
to determine, no contract for the sale of a cemetery lot or
deed in connection therewith in the form of the instruments
involved here has been registered as a security in this
jurisdiction. In making this statement we are not unmindful of the Aultorest contract attached to the agreed statement. That contract, however, as we have observed, has
express provisions for a burial contract or burial certificate which brings it within the express definition of our
statute.
In the thirty years which have passed since the enactment of said Chapter 87, Laws of Utah, 1925, without any
regulation under the Securities Act, thousands of cemetery
lots must have been sold in this state under contracts embodying provisions for perpetual care. A practice so long
employed is persuasive of the view that such instruments
have not been commonly known as a security.
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Tested by the rule stated above, the facts in this case,
it seems to us, compel the conclusion that the contract and
deed under investigation here are not a security within the
meaning of our statute.
II.
THE ENACTMENT OF CHAPTER 11, LAWS
OF UTAH, 1955, REMOVES ANY PUBLIC
NEED OR POLICY FOR CONSTRUING THE
CONTRACT AND DEED AS A SECURITY.
The legislature by the enactment of Chapter 11, Laws
of Utah, 1955, made comprehensive provisions for the operation, maintenance, and regulation of all cemeteries within
this state except those operated by religious and fraternal
organizations, and by cities and towns and other political
subdivisions.
Without considering the Act in detail, an examination
of its provisions will show that it is intended thereby to
bring cemeteries within the Department of Registration in
the Department of Business Regulation, and to subject such
institutions and their operations to stringent regulations,
particularly with respect to the creation and maintenance
of their endowment funds, and to require the procurement
of an annual certificate of authority for the conduct of a
cemetery operation.
The legislature concluded that the operation of cemeteries, other than those excluded from the Act, should be
placed under careful regulation. We have no quarrel with
that conclusion. The legislature further concluded that the
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appropriate agency to administer such regulation is the
Department of Registration within the Department of Business Regulation. No amendment was made of said Section
61-1-4 and no provision is found indicating that any registration or regulation is to be administered by the Securities
Commission.
Having vested jurisdiction of these institutions in one
branch of the Department of Business Regulation, we think
the legislature wisely and properly concluded that they
should not be subjected to regulation by another branch of
the same department. The confusion and possible conflicts
which might result from such dual control are obvious. The
provisions of said Chapter 11 for close supervision and
control of cemeteries, coupled with those for an annual
certificate of authority, and for revocation or suspension
of such authority upon violation of any of the provisions
of the Act, afford adequate protection to the public.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Trial Court construing the contract and deed of appellant to be a security should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
S. N. CORN,VALL,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,

Attorneys for Appellant.
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